Equity
Debts exceed assets in financial year 2026.
Debts exceed assets in financial year 2026.
From profit to loss in 2026, after a profit of €12,436 in 2025.
Of this, €1.0m falls due within a year.
Between 2023 and 2026, 70% of the full-time equivalents disappeared.
The last five annual accounts were filed 0 to 5 days before the end of the period.
Lower net result than 95% of companies in construction of buildings. Sector median €26,951 · 106 companies.
The dashed line is the sector median: 1.5% across 13,457 companies (NACE 41, micro).
About 7 in 100 comparable companies go bankrupt within 12 months (an estimate).
The band follows from the bankruptcy probability. 10 more points roughly halve it.
| 75-100 | Excellent | under 0.55% |
| 60-74 | Healthy | 0.55% to 1.5% |
| 45-59 | Fair | 1.5% to 4.2% |
| 25-44 | Weak | 4.2% to 15.0% |
| 0-24 | Critical | over 15.0% |
Where the company stands within its band depends half on the bankruptcy probability and half on how it does against its sector peers (NACE 41, micro). It does better than 9% of them on solvency, 3% on liquidity, 5% on profitability and 3% on growth.
The bankruptcy probability was computed on 04-11-2026 by the bankruptcy model of 2 October 2026, which learns from Belgian bankruptcies and reads the registers, the annual accounts and the Belgian Official Gazette.
The probability rests on the annual accounts with balance sheet date 31-03-2026.
Of the companies with a bankruptcy probability in the elevated class on 30-06-2025, 6.3% went bankrupt within twelve months.
Some facts cap the score, however low the probability. With negative or zero equity, a heavy loss, a special status in the KBO, one missing filing or accounts filed more than 90 days late, the score is Fair at most (59). With two missing filings, it is Weak at most (44). During a judicial reorganisation or at the company's end (bankruptcy, dissolution, liquidation), it is Critical at most (24).
In July 2024, 6,619 companies had the same profile as Renofield has now. Each dot stands for 17 companies, two years later.
Another 1.0% stopped without a precise date, possibly only after those two years.
The bankruptcy probability of Renofield itself is higher: 6.6% within 12 months. It rests on far more data about Renofield than the profile alone.
The method was tested on the 497,446 companies of July 2024. Each company was given the bankruptcy share of the same profile a year earlier, in July 2023. The expectation was that 1.6% would go bankrupt within 24 months. In fact 1.7% went bankrupt.
| Group | Expected | Actual |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0.2% | 0.2% |
| 2 | 0.3% | 0.5% |
| 3 | 0.5% | 0.6% |
| 4 | 0.7% | 0.8% |
| 5 | 0.9% | 0.9% |
| 6 | 1.3% | 1.5% |
| 7 | 1.6% | 1.8% |
| 8 | 1.8% | 1.8% |
| 9 | 3.0% | 3.1% |
| 10 | 5.6% | 6.2% |
A company that went bankrupt had a higher expected share than one that kept going in 74.5% of comparisons. The level depends on the economy. In a year with more bankruptcies than the year before, the actual share is higher than the expected one.
This is an observation about 6,619 companies, not a prediction for Renofield. The sector does not count, because the KBO no longer lists a sector for a company that has stopped. By sector, mostly the survivors would count, which would paint too rosy a picture.
Liquidity is insufficient, with a current ratio of 0.83 (1.06 in 2025), below 1. Short-term debt is 109.2% and cash 0.8% of total assets. Equity is negative.
Show the recommended maximum and see how the verdict changes with amount, term and advance.
The scores and ratios are Checked's own calculations, not a credit decision.
The company filed its last 7 accounts on average 2 days before the deadline. In the sector (NACE 41), the median for financial year 2023 was on the deadline day, and 47% of those companies filed late.
| Company | Total assets | Gross margin | Solvency | Staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Renofield Houthulst | €0.9m | €84,514 | -10.9% | 3.2 |
| YPSOROOF-IPSOTOIT Frameries | €1.0m | €63,329 | 75.3% | 4.2 |
| NAERT - DEFREYNE Ingelmunster | €0.8m | €157,368 | 0.7% | 5.4 |
| BOUWONDERNEMING SPRIET Izegem | €1.5m | €130,151 | 34.7% | 2 |
| BATILOOK Brussels | €1.1m | €148,329 | 52.9% | 2 |
| VERIBOUW Pajottegem | €0.7m | €111,230 | 12.5% | 1.9 |
| THE WALLS Antwerp | €0.8m | €133,814 | 69.1% | 2 |
These companies have the same main activity as Renofield: general construction of residential buildings (NACE 41001). They are comparable in size and age: total assets between €731,000 and €1.5m, founded between 1989 and 2006.
Renofield files the abbreviated format. That format states no turnover. The gross margin rose from -€1,725 in 2006 to €84,514 in 2026.
Renov8 holds all the shares. In 2023, three directors stepped down.
Sources: KBO register, filings at the National Bank, Belgian Official Gazette. Click a figure with a dotted line for the item and the filing.
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